History: We’re six-handed in the 2006 Main Event. Jamie Gold is the monster chip leader, as he has been throughout the event, and is playing most hands. He’s being tutored by Johnny Chan on the sidelines, but adopting a style that Chan would rarely apply himself: mixing up limps with raises regardless of position, and generally playing in an unpredictable style. Cunningham, meanwhile, had barely played a hand in the opening stages, but did lose a big pot against Gold a few hands ago, his trips out-kicked by T-9 on an As-9d-9h-8h-5s board. This put Gold up to 34 million, and Cunningham down to 12.
Jamie Gold is UTG+1; Cunningham is in the big blind. Let’s assume the blinds were 100,000 and 200,000 with a 10,000 running ante.
Gold raises to 800,000.
Cunningham looks down at [Ah-9d].
What’s your move? Is our stack to big too move all in preflop?
Simon Mairs says:
“With 60 big blinds, we cannot move in preflop here profitably. Also, we hold a considerable skill advantage over Gold, so even out of position I’m happy to see flops all day. However, A-9 off-suit is pretty weak, even against Gold’s UTG+1 range. It’s possible Cunningham has a bet sizing or physical tell here. Personally, I think I let this go, and fight my battles with Gold with hands that can flop better.”
Rob Jarrett- Smith says:
“Fold. I don’t want to play a medium off-suit ace out of position to an under-the-gun raise irrespective of the fact that the villain is playing a lot of hands. I’d be looking for a better spot to take Gold’s chips.
I think we’re far too deep to move all in here. I’m not three-betting all in for 60 big blinds with any cards in this spot.”
Cunningham calls.
Flop: [8h-3d-8d] (Pot = 1,760,000)
Cunningham checks, and Gold immediately bets 1,000,000, saying, “I don’t like my hand very much, so I’ll put in these.”
What’s your move? As an isolated incident, what do you make of Gold’s comment?
Simon Mairs says:
“So much is read dependant. A-9 is often good here, but can you check-call three streets? If I call here I’m planning to check-raise the turn if Gold bets again, as check-call, check-fold turn is awful versus this villain. With my tight image, I feel I can take this pot away from Gold on a later street, or just generally outplay him, so I call.
I would actually take Gold’s comment at face value, I find that people are generally truthful when they talk during a hand, and lie through their teeth when they talk about it afterward.”
Rob Jarrett-Smith says:
“Fold. We can’t represent much if we check-raise here, as this is the kind of board I’d be happy to check-call an overpair on. If we check-call with our hand as a float we’d have to be willing to check-raise a lot of turns as Gold is firing multiple barrels. I’m not calling down two more streets with ace high simply because I feel Gold is at it a lot of the time.
As an isolated incident, I’d take Gold’s comments to be more likely to reflect strength than weakness. Either way I wouldn’t put a lot of emphasis on it in this spot.”
Cunningham calls.
Turn: [2c] (Pot = 3,760,000)
What’s your move? If you call here, are you committing to calling the river too?
Simon Mairs says:
“I check here, planning to check-raise if Gold bets. I cannot check-fold here to this brick; I can represent a lot of strength if I check-raise, and only a very small percentage of Gold’s opening range can genuinely bet two streets for value against our perceived flop calling range, and even less of that can call a check-raise and face us jamming the river. I wish we had a few more chips for this, if Gold bets big, we may just have to jam the turn.”
Rob Jarrett- Smith says:
“Check. This is a total brick - what would we be representing by leading out? If we had an eight, a pair, a set, etc, we’d be checking. I don’t feel the need to protect my hand by betting here, as I don’t expect Gold to have many deuces in his range.
I don’t believe we are necessarily committed to calling the river if we call a bet on the turn, as a lot of it depends on the size of the bets. If Gold bets in excess of half the pot on the turn then we may well be committing ourselves if we call, as it’s pretty bad to be putting a third of our stack in and folding.”
Cunningham checks.
Gold checks.
River: [Qs] (Pot = 3,760,000)
What’s your move? Why do you think Gold checked the turn?
Simon Mairs says:
“When Gold checks the turn, I would read it as either he has some showdown value and is pot controlling, he is taking a free card on a draw or he is checking to keep his costs down for a second barrel on the river. I think he bets all his monsters on the turn, so I have Gold on air, or a queen if he bets. I think I check now, hoping he barrels his air, which could be just any two goofy cards or a missed flush draw.”
Rob Jarrett- Smith says:
“I’d check here. I don’t feel this is a particularly great river card. I’d expect Gold to have a high amount of Broadway cards in his range and he could have just got there with K-Q/Q-J, etc. This is the exact type of river card that I’d expect Gold to bet with any two cards when we check to him, so seeing as we have got this far in the hand, I’d be check-calling if he bets.
Gold’s check on the turn is consistent with someone who has given up on the hand, or having a hand that he doesn’t believe he could get three streets of value from. He could easily check behind with a pocket pair on the turn and put in a small value bet on the river.”
Cunningham taps the table again.
Gold quietly slides 2,000,000 across the felt and rests the side of his face on his fist.
Gold breaks his poker face and reaches for a drink.
What’s your move? Do you ever read anything into people reaching for a drink in these situations?
Simon Mairs says:
“I don’t like the queen, but I think we have to call; we’re beating enough of Gold’s range, and making an important statement that we won’t be pushed around, even if we lose this hand. That coupled with our tight image and perceived skill advantage should help us to stop having to play guessing games with Gold in big pots. Cunningham’s aim here must be to chip away and stick around to get Gold heads-up, where he can really press his advantage every hand.
When people reach for a drink, it is supposed to be a sign of comfort, but everyone knows that just about, so it’s often used as a reverse tell, so I wouldn’t read much into it either way. If I had to, I’d probably figure that Gold would be aware of this and more likely to use it as a fake tell, rather than going one level up and doing the old fake fake tell.”
Rob Jarrett- Smith says:
“Call. We only need to be good one in four times in this spot for this play to be breakeven and I’d expect we’d be good more often than that. If Gold had bet the turn, then river, this would be a fold, but the fact he’s pot controlled the turn gives us the odds to look him up on the river.
I’d normally expect someone reaching for a drink to be a sign of a relaxed state, which, given that it’s the final table of the World Series, seems hard to believe. Gold seems desperate to constantly misdirect us with his actions, claiming his hand is weak, taking a drink at a crucial juncture, and as such I’m entirely focused on how the hand has played out and not his tells, real or otherwise.”
“You just might have a queen,” smiles Cunningham. “Can’t help it.”
“Do you have a queen?” asks Gold. Cunningham shrugs.
“I probably don’t have an eight,” continues Gold. “I definitely don’t have deuce-three. I could just have a couple of… I don’t know.”
“King-queens?” probes Cunningham.
“I’ll show you. I’ve been showing a lot of bluffs, I don’t mind showing.”
“I was thinking of calling anyway,” reveals Cunningham.
“All right,” says Gold, reaching for his cards.
“I haven’t called yet, hold on.”
Cunningham makes the call.
“You’re good,” says Gold as he mucks his hand.
Do you think Gold should have remained silent? What do you think Gold should have done differently to win the hand?
Simon Mairs says:
“Interesting speech play by Gold, but I always think it’s best to keep quiet, unless it’s your decision, then get them talking if you can. However, it worked for Gold all tournament; no one seemed to figure him out, and everyone looked pretty stupid on TV with the hole cards exposed, but he tilted some top players, so he must have been doing something right. I think an interesting aspect of this type of thing is that it often distracts good players away from their real skill, which is analytical hand reading, and gets them playing mind games, which they’re often not nearly as good at.
I think as played, Gold’s only real chance of winning the hand is to bet bigger on the river. With four million in the middle, Cunningham has ten million behind. If Gold bets five million here, Cunningham is in a gross spot, and will be left with a nasty 25 big blinds stack if he calls and loses. He may be really suspicious of the overbet, but it’s a huge call with ace high, and he has to figure he’ll find better spots later on.”
Rob Jarrett- Smith says:
“I’d definitely advocate Gold keeping silent throughout hands against experienced pros. Whilst his table chat worked extremely well against a number of amateurs, it would probably be wise to reign it in against the likes of Cunningham.
I’d expect Gold could have won the hand by barrelling the turn and river. Cunningham may well have believed Gold was at it but it would have been extremely difficult for him to call for his tournament life with ace high. No matter how much money, or how many bracelets, Cunningham has won, the opportunity to play the Main Event of the final table at the World Series of Poker comes along once in a lifetime, if you’re lucky. With that in mind, Gold could have wielded the hammer of his stack and pushed Cunningham off his marginal holding.”
Simon Mairs and Robert Jarrett-Smith both became Blue Belts as a result of the Grading process. If you would like to express your views on the hand, then please leave your feedback in the comments’ box below.